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JUDGMENT LIENS AND PRIORITIES IN VIRGINIA
The creditor who decides to prosecute a money claim has an ar-
ray of remedies available to him to compel its payment. As this
Note and others in the Symposium illustrate, the postjudgment
collection remedies are rooted in Virginia's colomal period and
have remained largely intact to the present day In order for the
creditor to select intelligently among the available choices, he first
must develop an understanding of them. In Virginia, a judgment
may be enforced against the debtor's personalty by a writ of fierz
factas1 or by a writ of garnishment.2 The judgment itself, however,
creates a lien only on the debtor's interest in real estate.3 This
Note will focus on the judgment lien in Virginia, particularly the
priority of the lien in relation to other judgment lienors, purchas-
ers from the debtor, and creditors or third parties with an interest
in the realty subject to the lien. Federal tax liens and bankruptcy
provisions also will be discussed insofar as they affect the ability of
the creditor to enforce the judgment lien.
The lien created by a judgment is one of the highest forms of
security because it gives an otherwise unsecured creditor the right
to force the sale of the debtor's interest in realty through a credi-
tor's bill in equity.4 The judgment lien does not give rise to a pro-
prietary right in the debtor's land;5 rather, the creditor obtains
only the right to levy on any of the lands to the exclusion of inter-
ests arising after the judgment.6 The lien does not attach to a par-
1. VA. CODE § 8.01-474 (Repl. Vol. 1977). See Note, Enforcing Money Judgments Against
Personal Property in Virginia, supra this issue.
2. VA. CODE §§ 8.01-511 to 525.
3. Id. § 8.01-458. See notes 47-71 infra & accompanying text. For a discussion of the
common law and the early colonial history of judgment creditors' collection procedures and
the development of the judgment lien, see Riesenfeld, Enforcement of Money Judgments in
Early American History, 71 MICu. L. REV. 691 (1975), and Riesenfeld, Collection of Money
Judgments in American Law - A Historical Inventory and a Prospectus, 42 IowA L. REV.
155 (1957).
4. See Hansucker v. Walker, 76 Va. 753, 755-56 (1882); VA. CODE § 8.01-462 (Repl. Vol.
1977). The procedural aspects of enforcing a judgment lien through a creditor's bill in equity
is discussed in E. MEADE, LINE's EQUITY PLEADING AND PRACCE (3d ed. 1952).
5. Jones v. Hall, 177 Va. 658, 664, 15 S.E.2d 108, 110 (1941).
6. Id. In Jones, the Virginia Supreme Court quoted extensively from Justice Story's opin-
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ticular piece of property but operates as a general lien on all the
debtor's realty Enforcing the lien through a creditor's bill, how-
ever, is both costly and time consuming; consequently, in most
cases the creditor will find it impractical. The lien's real value may
lie in its utility as a means to encourage a reluctant but solvent
debtor who is unwilling to risk losing his real estate or as a security
device to preserve the creditor's claim until some future time when
the debtor is able to satisfy the judgment out of other assets.
PERFECTION OF THE JUDGMENT LIEN AND THE DOCKETING PROCESS
In Virginia, the judgment must be docketed in the clerk's office
of the county or city in which the debtor's real estate is situated in
order to constitute a lien on that real estate.7 Virginia no longer
ion in Conard v. Atlantic Ins. Co., 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 386, 443 (1828):
"[The judgment lien] only confers a right to levy on the same, to the exclu-
sion of other adverse interests, subsequent to the judgment; and when the levy
is actually made on the same, the title of the creditor, for this purpose, relates
back to the time of his judgment, so as to cut out intermediate incumbrances.
But subject to this, the debtor has full power to sell or otherwise dispose of the
land. His title to it is not divested or transferred by the judgment, to the judg-
ment-creditor In short, a judgment-creditor has no jus in re, but a mere
power to make its general lien effectual, by following up the steps of the law,
and consummating his judgment by an execution and levy on the land. If the
debtor should sell the estate, he has no right to follow the proceeds of the sale,
into the hands of the vendor or vendee, or to claim the purchase-money in the
hands of the latter."
177 Va. at 664, 15 S.E.2d at 110. See 2 A. FREMAN, LAW OF JUDGMENTS § 915 (5th ed. 1925).
7. VA. CODE § 8.01-458 (Repl. Vol. 1977). Section 8.01-458, formerly §§ 8-390 and 8-386,
was changed substantially in 1960. 1960 Va. Acts ch. 466. Before the 1960 amendment, § 8-
386 provided that a judgment rendered in Virginia, other than by confession in vacation,
was a lien on all the Virginia real estate that the debtor possessed or was entitled to at the
time the judgment was rendered or that he later acquired. If the case could have been heard
on the first day of the term, the rendition date of the judgment related back to the first day
of the term. Under the former law, the lien of a confessed judgment ran from the time of the
day the confession was made. Id. §§ 8-355, -358, -386 (1950) (repealed 1977); see American
Bank & Trust Co. v. National Bank, 170 Va. 169, 176, 196 S.E. 693, 696 (1938); Hockman v.
Hockman, 93 Va. 455, 459, 25 S.E. 534, 535 (1896).
The primary change made in 1960 was that a judgment lien would commence only when
recorded in the clerk's office in the city or county where the land was located. The relation
back doctrine no longer applied, and the date the judgment was rendered had no effect on
either commencement of the lien or the priority of judgment liens. Section 8-390, however,
still required docketing to create a valid judgment lien only as against a purchaser for value
without notice. A strange notice procedure resulted, requiring recordation and docketing of
a judgment to create a lien against a purchaser for value without notice but requiring only
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follows the relation-back doctrine, which states that a lien created
by a docketed judgment relates back to the first day of the court
term at which the judgment was rendered." Virginia law provides
that a judgment lien is effective from the date of the original dock-
eting.9 The docketing requirement notifies potential purchasers
and lenders of a judgment lien on the debtor's land in that particu-
lar county or city without requiring them to check every clerk's
office in the state. The docketing of a judgment to create a lien is a
privilege of the creditor, not a duty; failure to docket will deny a
creditor the benefit of the lien if the real estate is transferred or
subsequent liens are established.1"
Because the purpose of docketing is to provide notice to other
interested parties, a judgment is not properly docketed" unless it
is indexed.1 2 The index must show the names of all parties to the
suit; a judgment is not docketed as to a defendant in whose name
it is not indexed.1 3 In determining whether the name docketed and
recordation to commence the lien as against all others. See Wiltshire, The New Judgment
Lien on Lands, 1 U. RICH. L. Rav. 313, 315 (1962). Present § 8.01-458 resolves this conflict
by requiring docketing to commence the lien as against all the world. 1964 Va. Acts ch. 309.
The 1960 amendment also narrowed the scope of a judgment lien from a lien on all the
debtor's Virginia realty to a lien on the debtor's lands in the county or city where the judg-
ment is docketed. Section 8-386, now 8.01-431, also provided for commencement of the lien
of a judgment by confession from the time the judgment was docketed in the clerk's office in
the county or city where the defendant's land was situated. Judgments by confession in
vacation that did not give rise to a lien until 1960 and only then from the date of confession
now are subject to the same provisions regarding commencement of the lien as other judg-
ments. VA. CODE § 8.01-445 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
8. See M. BURKS, COMMON LAW AND STATUTORY PLEADING AND PRACTICE § 342 (4th ed.
1952) (discussing Virginia's departure from the relation back doctrine and return to it
before the most recent abandonment in VA. CODE § 8.01-458 (Repl. Vol. 1977)).
9. VA. CODE § 8.01-458 (Repl. Vol. 1977); see note 7 supra.
10. See text accompanying notes 107-10 infra.
11. The mechanics for docketing a judgment are covered by Virginia Code §§ 8.01-446 to
8.01-454. Sections 8.01-446 and 8.01-447 provide for entry of any Virginia or federal court
judgment in special "judgment docket" books. Section 8.01-449 prescribes the content of the
judgment docket book. VA. CODE §§ 8.01-446 to 454 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
12. Id. § 8.01-450. In Fulkerson v. Taylor, 100 Va. 426, 436, 41 S.E. 863, 867 (1902), the
court stated that allegations of proper docketing in a bill to enforce a judgment are suffi-
cient allegations of the judgment's indexing and that no proof of indexing is necessary if
that fact is not put in issue. The court held that production of an abstract of the judgment
that does not certify docketing and indexing is insufficient.
13. VA. CODE § 8.01-450 (Repl. Vol. 1977). See Richardson v. Gardner, 128 Va. 676, 686,
105 S.E. 225, 228 (1920); Fulkerson's Adm'x v. Taylor, 102 Va. 314, 317, 46 S.E. 309, 309
(1904); Bankers Loan & Inv. Co. v. Blair, 99 Va. 606, 611, 39 S.E. 231, 233 (1901).
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indexed gives sufficient notice despite errors or omissions, the
courts consider whether a third person exercising ordinary care
and prudence would discover the existence and character of the
judgment.14 For example, in docketing a judgment against a mar-
ried woman, the omission of her maiden name is fatal to notice of
the judgment.15 Assignments of a judgment also are entered on the
docket book. Assigned judgments are enforced in the same manner
as other judgments, except that they are enforced in the name of
the assignees as plaintiff.'
TYPES OF JUDGMENTS CAPABLE OF CREATING LIENS
Money Judgments and Decrees
Virginia statutory law provides that properly docketed money
judgments rendered in the Commonwealth by any state or federal
court or by confession 17 are liens on the debtor's real property 18
Final awards and determinations by the court of law or equity'
directing the payment of money are included in the term "money
judgments." Recognizances and bonds having the force of judg-
ments also are included in the term "judgment" for the purpose of
creating a lien. 0
Judgments against fictitious persons or corporations are not liens upon the property of
the true owner. Leckie v. Seal, 161 Va. 215, 226, 170 S.E. 844, 848 (1933).
14. See Fulkerson's Adm'x v. Taylor, 102 Va. 314, 317, 46 S.E. 309, 309 (1904). In Fulker-
son, the court held that use of the word "same" in the index beneath the debtor's name with
reference to the page on which the judgment is recorded is sufficient. Id. at 316, 46 S.E. at
309.
15. Bankers Loan & Inv. Co. v. Blair, 99 Va. 606, 611, 39 S.E. 231, 233 (1901). A judgment
should be docketed in all the names a defendant is known to use. If the judgment debtor
changes his or her name by marriage, court order, or voluntary assumption of a new name,
the clerk of the circuit court where the judgment was obtained must docket and index the
judgment in the new name upon receipt of an affidavit stating the change in name. VA. CODE
§ 8.01-451 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
16. VA. CODE § 8.01-452 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
17. In any suit, a defendant may confess a judgment for an amount plus interest that the
creditor is willing to accept. Id. § 8.01-431.
18. Id. § 8.01-458.
19. A decree in equity requiring the payment of money has the effect of a money judg-
ment and the person entitled to benefit from the decree is a judgment creditor. Id. §§ 8.01-
426 to 427. Originally, no decree of an equity court was a lien on the defendant's lands, nor
could it be made so by issuing a writ of elegit because no execution could issue on a decree
in equity. See Hook v. Ross, 11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 310 (1807).
20. VA. CODE § 8.01-465 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
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In alimony and child support situations, a docketed support de-
cree gives rise to a lien on the debtor's realty, even as to future
installments,21 under the general judgment lien statute.22 The
court also has power to charge specific realty with a lien.23
A judgment rendered against the personal representative of a de-
ceased debtor does not create a lien on the decedent's estate be-
cause a lien can be created only in debtor's lifetime.24 If the judg-
ment is against a defendant m his name and not in his official title
as executor, administrator, personal representative, or trustee, it is
a personal judgment binding the real estate of the defendant, not
that of the estate.25
A judgment that is void for lack of service of process26 or insuffi-
cient service creates no lien and may be attacked in a collateral
proceeding. 27 A docketed judgment that is not void but voidable,
however, gives rise to a lien until the judgment is reversed.2 s If the
21. Morris v. Henry, 193 Va. 631, 70 S.E.2d 417 (1952). In many states, there is no lien for
future installments. See, e.g., Slack v. Mullenix, 245 Iowa 956, 66 N.W.2d 99 (1954); Brieger
v. Brieger, 197 Kan. 756, 421 P.2d 1 (1966); Boyle v. Baggs, 10 Utah 2d 203, 350 P.2d 622
(1966). See generally Annot., 59 A.L.R.2d 656 (1956).
22. VA. CODE § 8.01-458 (Repl. Vol. 1977). Cf. Durett v. Durett, 204 Va. 59, 63, 129 S.E.2d
50, 53 (1963) (contract m lieu of alimony approved by court does not create lien on debtor's
realty).
23. VA. COnE § 8.01-460 (Cum. Supp. 1979). See Wilson v. Wilson, 195 Va. 1060, 1067, 81
S.E.2d 605, 613 (1954). In Cannavos v. Cannavos, 205 Va. 744, 748, 139 S.E.2d 825, 828
(1966), the court held that the chancellor has discretion to provide that the order for sup-
port payments should not be a lien on the obligor's real estate.
24. A judgment recovered by a creditor against the administrator of an estate evidences a
debt in an equity proceeding against the heirs and devisees. See Kidwell v. Henderson, 150
Va. 829, 838, 143 S.E. 336, 340 (1928). But see Lee v. Swepson, 76 Va. 173, 176-79 (1882)
(conditional decree directing executor to pay debts of estate constitutes lien on real estate of
executor).
If the defendant dies after service of process but before judgment is rendered, the judg-
ment is voidable. See Alvis v. Saunders, 113 Va. 208, 211, 74 S.E. 153, 154 (1912); Robinett's
Adm'r v. Mitchell, 101 Va. 762, 765, 45 S.E. 287, 287 (1903). See also note 28 uifra & accom-
panying text.
25. See Fulkerson v. Taylor, 100 Va. 426, 434, 41 S.E. 863, 866 (1902); Lincoln's Adm'r v.
Stern, 64 Va. (23 Gratt.) 816, 822 (1873).
26. See American Ry. Express v. F.S. Royster Guano C*°, 141 Va. 602, 608, 126 S.E. 678,
680 (1925), aft'd, 273 U.S. 274 (1927); Staunton Perpetual Bldg. & Loan Co. v. Haden, 92
Va. 201, 204, 23 S.E. 285, 286 (1895).
27. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877); Harris v. Deal, 189 Va. 675, 687, 54 S.E.2d
161, 166 (1949) (no rights obtained from void judgment); Anthony v. Kasey, 83 Va. 338, 340,
5 S.E. 176, 178 (1887).
28. See Fulkerson's Adm'x v. Taylor, 102 Va. 314, 318, 46 S.E. 309, 310 (1904) (discussing
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voidable judgment is being enforced by a bill in chancery, then the
debtor cannot assail its validity because this attack would be col-
lateral.29 An independent proceeding is necessary to attack the
judgment and dissolve the lien.
Under a properly docketed money judgment or decree in its
favor,30 the Commonwealth becomes a judgment lienor.3 1 The Vir-
ginia Code provides for a special sale of the debtor's real property
under a writ of fieri facias"2 when the Commonwealth is the judg-
ment creditor.38 Unlike the normal foreclosure sale, the writ must
be enforced against the debtor's personalty before his real estate
can be sold.3
Criminal fines and other monetary penalties3 5 payable to the
Commonwealth give rise to a judgment lien on the real property of
the criminal defendant when properly docketed. Section 19.2-340
of the Virginia Code provides: "Fines imposed and costs taxed in a
criminal prosecution for committing an offense against the State
shall constitute a judgment in favor of the Commonwealth, and, if
not paid at the time they were imposed, execution may issue
thereon in the same manner as upon any other monetary
judgment. '86
Judgments of State, Foreign and Federal Courts
In Virginia, the clerk of court automatically dockets judgments
rendered in circuit courts.3 7 The judgments of the general district
a voidable execution).
29. Id.
30. The Attorney General of Virginia and other attorneys representing the Common-
wealth are required to docket all judgments recovered in favor of the state in any city or
county where the debtor owns real property in order to create lien. VA. CODE § 8.01-448
(Repl. Vol. 1977).
31. Id. § 8.01-458. Before creation of the statutory judgment lien in 1849, judgments m
favor of the state were liens on the debtor's realty. See Leake v. Ferguson, 43 Va. (2 Gratt.)
420, 428 (1846); Nimmo's Ex'r v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. (4 Hen. & M.) 57 (1809).
32. This writ normally applies only to personalty. See note 1 supra.
33. VA. CODE § 8.01-201 (Repl. Vol. 1977). This special procedure is dealt with in id. §§
8.01-196 to 216.
34. Id. § 8.01-203.
35. Id. § 19.2-341 (Repl. Vol. 1975).
36. Id. § 19.2-340.
37. Id. § 8.01-446 (Repl. Vol. 1977). Nevertheless, the creditor should verify that his judg-
ment has been docketed.
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courts, however, are docketed on the request of an interested party
if he presents an authenticated abstract of the judgment or the
district court judge properly files his book or certifies an abstract.3 8
To create a judgment lien on real estate located within the state
but outside the jurisdiction of the rendering court, the creditor
must deliver an authenticated abstract of the judgment to the
clerk of the circuit in the city or county where the land is situated;
the clerk then will docket and index the judgment as he would a
judgment rendered by that court.3
Judgments and decrees of federal courts sitting in Virginia be-
come liens on the debtor's realty in the same manner as a state
court judgment;40 they become liens on real property when dock-
eted and indexed in the clerk's office where the property is located.
To create a lien based on a foreign federal court judgment, the
judgment first must be registered in a federal district court in Vir-
ginia.41 The United States Code provides that any final federal
court judgment may be registered in any other federal district
court by filing with it a certified copy of the judgment.42 Once reg-
istered, the judgment has the effect of a judgment of the district
court where registered and may be enforced as such.43 Accordingly,
a foreign federal court judgment properly registered creates a lien
on realty located in Virginia when it has been docketed in the
manner prescribed for in-state federal judgments.
Because judgments of other states and foreign countries are
without effect outside the territorial limits of the rendering juris-
diction, they cannot be docketed to create a lien on Virginia re-
alty 44 To acquire a judgment lien in Virginia based upon the judg-
38. Id. The clerks of the circuit courts are required to docket any judgment rendered by
any court of the Commonwealth.
39. Id.
40. 28 U.S.C. § 1962 (1970).
41. Id., VA. CODE §§ 8.01-447, -448 (Repl. Vol. 1977). See Note, Judgments - State Stat-
utes Prescribing Formalities of Recording Federal Judgments before They Become Liens,
15 VA. L. REv. 86 (1928).
42. 28 U.S.C. § 1963 (1970).
43. Id.
44. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Whaley, 173 Va. 11, 15, 3 S.E.2d 395, 396 (1939). See U.S.
CONsT. art. IV, § 1. The full faith and credit doctrine permits a creditor to enforce a state's
valid in personam judgment in any other state. Virginia, however, like most states, requires
a Virginia action on the foreign judgment to create a domestic judgment before state credi-
tors' remedies can be used.
1980] 925
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ment of another state or country, the plaintiff .must obtain a
domestic judgment by bringing an action at law on the foreign
judgment. If, however, such an action on the judgment would be
barred by the law of the rendering jurisdiction, Virginia courts will
not entertain the action.45 Furthermore, no acton may be brought
on a foreign judgment "rendered more than ten years before the
commencement of the action."'46
THE NATURE OF THE JUDGMENT LIEN
Types of Interest in Real Property to which Judgment Lien
Attaches
The judgment lien does not apply to specific property but to all
the debtor's realty in the city or county where the judgment is
docketed;47 only upon foreclosure does the judgment lien operate
against specific land. The lien attaches to the land itself and to
most of the debtor's alienable interests therein, including equitable
interests, unrecorded interests, and interests acquired after the
judgment.48 Interests that the record of title indicates the debtor
held either before or after docketing are subject to the lien, unless
the record also shows a prior transfer.4 A docketed judgment also
imposes a lien upon real estate that the debtor conveyed in fraud
of the judgment creditor after the debt was incurred but before the
judgment lien arose.50
45. VA. CODE § 8.01-252 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
46. Id.
47. Id. § 8.01-458.
48. Certain types of property are exempt from creditors' claims. For example, any type of
growing crop not severed from the land is exempt. Id. § 8.01-489. Properties qualifying for
"homestead" or other exemptions are listed in id. §§ 34-1 to 34-28 (Repl. Vol. 1976). The
homestead exemption of $5,000 may be claimed by filing a homestead deed any time before
attempted sale of that property. Id. § 34-4 (Cum. Supp. 1979), §§ 34-6, -17 (Repl. Vol. 1976).
Also of significance to the judgment creditor is § 34-18, which provides that rents and prof-
its from exempt property are also exempt. See Note, The Failure of the Virginta Exemp-
tion Plan, supra this issue.
49. VA. CODE § 8.01-458 (Repl. Vol. 1977). In order for a judgment creditor to subject real
estate, or some interest therein, to a judgment lien, the debtor must have present or former
title to the specific land or interest. Miller v. Kemp, 157 Va. 178, 190, 160 S.E. 203, 206
(1931).
For a discussion of the effect of the debtor's transfer of land on the judgment lien, see
notes 111-28 infra & accompanying text.
50. See Matney v. Combs, 171 Va. 244, 250, 198 S.E. 469, 472 (1938); Tucker v. Foster,
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A judgment creditor can obtain no greater right to the debtor's
real estate than that possessed by the debtor when the judgment
was docketed or thereafter.51 The right to foreclose is limited to
the debtor's interest in the real estate and is subject to every liabil-
ity and equity under which the debtor held the mterest.52 If the
beneficial or legal title of the judgment debtor appears on the re-
cord, then the judgment lien against the debtor is superior to the
equities of third persons.53 Conversely, if the judgment debtor
holds equitable title not appearing on the record, then the judg-
ment creditor's lien is subject to superior equities." Furthermore,
mere equitable title held in trust by the judgment debtor for
others is not a property interest that can be subjected to a judg-
ment lien.5 5 The lien likewise does not reach a debtor's security
interest in real property, such as a mortgage, deed of trust, or
mechanic's lien.56
When the judgment lien is created it attaches to the land of the
debtor and to any improvements.57 For example, if the debtor
owns a piece of undeveloped real estate when the judgment is
docketed and later builds a house on the property, then the lien
attaches to both the dwelling and the lot. Similarly, if land subject
to a judgment lien is sold later to a purchaser for value who makes
improvements, then the lien also will attach to the improvements;
154 Va. 182, 192, 152 S.E. 376, 379 (1930). In Tucker, however, the court recognized that a
judgment lien on fraudulently conveyed land is subject to the superior equities of a bona
fide purchaser for value. 154 Va. at 193, 152 S.E. at 379.
51. See Miller v. Kemp, 157 Va. 178, 193, 160 S.E. 203, 207 (1931) (quoting Floyd v.
Harding, 69 Va. (28 Gratt.) 401, 407 (1877)); Savings & Loan Corp. v. Bear, 155 Va. 312,
331, 154 S.E. 587, 594 (1930); Powell v. Bell's Adm'r, 81 Va. 222, 233 (1885).
52. See Miller v. Kemp, 157 Va. at 193, 160 S.E. at 207 (quoting Floyd v. Harding, 69 Va.
(28 Gratt.) 401, 407 (1877)); Savings & Loan Corp. v. Bear, 155 Va. at 331, 154 S.E. at 594.
53. Miller v. Kemp, 157 Va. at 203-04, 160 S.E. at 211.
54. Id.
55. Straley v. Esser, 117 Va. 135, 145, 83 S.E. 1075, 1078 (1915) (debtor with legal title
has no beneficial interest in the land that could be subject to a judgment lien when the
purchase price was paid by another); Coldiron v. Asheville Shoe Co., 93 Va. 364, 372, 25 S.E.
238, 241 (1896).
56. Augusta Nat'l Bank v. Beard's Ex'r, 100 Va. 687, 694, 42 S.E. 694, 696 (1902).
57. See Nixdorf v. Blount, 1-11 Va. 127, 128, 68 S.E. 258, 259 (1910); Flanary v. Kane, 102
Va. 547, 560, 46 S.E. 312, 316 (1904). Virginia Code § 8.01-166, dealing. with improvements,
has no application to a judgment creditor seeking to enforce his lien upon improved lands.
Flanary v. Kane, 102 Va. at 558, 46 S.E. at 315 (referring to predecessor sections to § 8.01-
166).
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in such circumstances the docketing that created the lien consti-
tutes notice to the purchaser.58 Severable items such as timber and
crops are considered part of the land and are subject to a judgment
lien as long as they remain attached to the land.59 If they are sev-
ered, then the judgment creditor cannot sue the debtor for waste;
his remedy is a suit to enforce the judgment before severance or a
writ of execution on the severed articles.60 Timber and crops are
forms of rents and profits derived from -land; thus other forms of
rents and profits arguably also would not be subject to the lien
although the land itself would be.6 '
Because Virginia law recognizes the common law forms of con-
current ownership of property,62 the judgment creditor faces a
number of obstacles when he seeks to enforce his lien against a
debtor who owns his property jointly with others. Of course, if the
judgment is against the cotenants jointly, then he may enforce the
lien against the property regardless of the form of coownership.
The general rule is that a judgment lien based on a judgment
rendered against an individual debtor attaches to the jointly held
property 6s Whether the lien can be enforced against the property,
however, depends on the form of cotenancy If the property is held
as tenants by the entirety it cannot be severed by the individual
act of either spouse.6 4 This effectively immunizes entirety property
from the claims of creditors of the individual spouses. 5 On the
58. Nixdorf v. Blount, 111 Va. at 129, 68 S.E. at 259 (1910); see Flanary v. Kane, 102 Va.
at 560, 46 S.E. at 317.
59. See Jones v. Hall, 177 Va. 658, 665, 15 S.E.2d 108, 111 (1941) (quoting 2 A. FREEMAN,
supra note 6, § 940).
60. Id. (quoting Lee v. Keech, 151 Md. 34, 133 A. 835 (1926)).
61. Id. (quoting 2 A. FREEMAN, supra note 6, § 940).
62. Virginia recognizes four forms of concurrent ownership in real property: tenancy in
common, joint tenancy, tenancy by the entirety, and tenancy in coparcenary. The particular
attributes of each form are discussed in 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY (Casner ed. 1952) and
R. MINOR, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1928). Virginia has abolished by statute
tenancies by the entirety and joint tenancies except when the instrument creating the coten-
ancy expressly provides otherwise. VA. CODE §§ 55-20, 21 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
63. See, e.g., Zeigler v. Bonnell, 52 Cal. App. 2d 217, 126 P.2d 118 (1942); People's Trust
& Sav. Bank v. Haas, 328 Ill. 468, 160 N.E. 85 (1927); Eder v. Rothamel, 202 Md. 189, 95
A.2d 860 (1953). See generally Annot., 111 A.L.R. 171 (1937).
64. Vasilion v. Vasilion, 192 Va. 735, 66 S.E.2d 599 (1951); Allen v. Parkey, 154 Va. 739,
149 S.E. 615 (1929), aff]d on rehearing, 154 Va. 749, 154 S.E. 919 (1930). See Murphy,
Cotenancies: A Critique for Creditors, 48 VA. L. REV. 405 (1962).
65. Vasilion v. Vasilion, 192 Va. 735, 66 S.E.2d 599 (1951); Allen v. Parkey, 154 Va. 739,
928 [Vol. 21:919
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other hand, property held as a joint tenancy or a tenancy in com-
mon may be liable for the debts of the individual cotenants. Vir-
ginia recognizes that both of these forms of cotenancy are aliena-
ble6e and that alienability and liability for debts are inseparable.87
The Virginia Code expressly provides that a lien creditor may com-
pel partition of joint tenancies and tenancies in common m land to
satisfy his lien.8
An attribute of both the tenancy by the entirety and the joint
tenancy is the right of survivorship. On the death of a cotenant, his
interest in the property is extinguished and the surviving cotenants
own the whole; the decedent passes nothing to his estate.6 9 There-
fore, a lien on property held as tenancy by the entirety or joint
tenancy is lost if the debtor predeceases the other cotenants.70
Conversely, should the debtor outlive the cotenants and thereby
become vested with sole ownership of the property, his creditors
may reach the entire estate. Tenancy in common has no right of
survivorship feature and creditors of such a tenant can reach his
interest even after his death. 1
Statutory Limits on Enforcement of the Judgment Lien
Jurisdiction to enforce judgment lien is in equity by means of
the creditor's bill;72 venue is in the city or county where the land is
149 S.E. 615 (1929).
66. Leonard v. Boswell, 197 Va. 713, 90 S.E.2d 872 (1956) (joint tenancy); Murphy, supra
note 64, at 408.
67. Mears v. Taylor, 142 Va. 824, 128 S.E. 264 (1925); Murphy, supra note 64, at 408.
68. VA. CODE § 8.01-81 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
69. See generally 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPRTY, supra note 62, §§ 6.1, 6.6; Murphy, supra
note 64, at 408.
70. Murphy, supra note 64, at 408.
71. In Johnson's Ex'r v. National Exch. Bank, 74 Va. (33 Gratt.) 473 (1880), executor of a
deceased tenant in common sold the decedent's moiety to the surviving tenant subject to
prior liens against the decedent. Judgment creditors of a subsequent purchaser of the moi-
ety from the living tenant brought the enforcement suit. The court held that the surviving
tenant purchased decedent's moiety subject to the lien of the executor's decree, but the lien
did not reach the entire estate. The judgment creditors prevailed against the executor's de-
cree, however, because they had no notice of it. Id. at 487.
72. VA. CODE § 8.01-462 (Repl. Vol. 1977). Virginia's use of the term "creditor's bill" dif-
fers from the use of the term in other states where it generally denotes supplementary or
interrogatory-type proceedings.
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located in whole or in part.73 A judgment creditor need not proceed
first against personalty of the debtor by execution; he may resort
immediately to the court of equity to enforce his lien against real
property 71
Before a court in equity will decree a sale of the realty, the Vir-
ginia Code requires that the creditor establish that the rents and
profits of all real estate subject to the lien will not satisfy the judg-
ment in five years.75 If insufficient rents and profits are not alleged
or are alleged and denied, then the court must determine with rea-
sonable certainty the five-year value of rents and profits before de-
creeing a sale.76 If the parties do not seek to determine whether the
rents and profits for five years are sufficient, they are presumed to
have waived inquiry, and the court may decree a sale. 7 Inadequacy
of rents and profits may be shown by the parties' pleadings, admis-
sions, or evidence."8 Additionally, the Code maintains the require-
ment that the amount of the judgment exceed twenty dollars, ex-
clusive of interest and costs, before equity will enforce the
73. Id. § 8.01-261(3)(b). If the land overlaps two jurisdictions, the suit may be brought in
either. Id. See Clayton v. Hensley, 73 Va. (32 Gratt.) 65, 71 (1879).
74. See Moore v. Bruce, 85 Va. 139, 142, 7 S.E. 195, 197 (1888); Stovall v. Border Grange
Bank, 78 Va. 188, 191 (1883).
75. VA. CODE § 8.01-462 (Repl. Vol. 1977). This section deals only with jurisdiction of
equity suits to enforce judgment liens. Neff v. Wooding, 83 Va. 432, 435, 2 S.E. 731, 732
(1887) (suit to enforce vendor's lien). See Kyger v. Sipe, 89 Va. 507, 511, 16 S.E. 627, 628
(1892) (suit to enforce deed of trust).
76. See Neff v. Wooding, 83 Va. 432, 435, 2 S.E. 731, 732 (1887); Muse v. Friedenwald, 77
Va. 57, 60-61 (1883); Ewart v. Saunders, 66 Va. (25 Gratt.) 203-207 (1874).
Virginia Code § 8.01-462 provides no procedure for determining the value of rents and
profits. The court usually directs a commissioner to ascertain and report the annual rents
and profits of the land. In making his decision, the commissioner should consider rental
value of all the debtor's realty, including lands located elsewhere in the state. Cf. Kane v.
Mann, 93 Va. 239, 244, 24 S.E. 938, 939 (1896) (debtor cannot agree with spouse not bound
by judgment to have spouse's land included in the five year estimate). If the rents and
profits for five years can satisfy the judgment, the rental terms are in the discretion of the
court. Compton v. Fabor, 73 Va. (32 Gratt.) 121, 123 (1879). One authority interprets "rents
and profits" to mean net rents and profits after paying cost of suit, current taxes, and other
expenses from renting the property. See M. BURKS, supra note 8, § 356.
77. Brengle v. Richardson's Adm'r, 78 Va. 406, 412 (1884); Ewart v. Saunders, 66 Va. (25
Gratt.) 203, 208 (1874); M'Clung v. Beirne, 37 Va. (10 Leigh) 410, 421 (1839).
78. See Etter v. Scott, 90 Va. 762, 766, 19 S.E. 776, 778 (1894) (quoting Horton v. Bond,
69 Va. (28 Gratt.) 815, 821 (1877)); Neff v. Wooding, 83 Va. 432, 435 (1887); Horton v. Bond,
69 Va. (28 Gratt.) 815, 821 (1877).
1980] JUDGMENT LIENS AND PRIORITIES
judgment by sale of the property 71
Redemption
A number of jurisdictions allow a judgment debtor or other in-
terested party to redeem the debtor's realty within a certain period
following a foreclosure sale.80 Virginia, however, does not permit
redemption. 1 The reason for this policy is unclear. The rule seems
harsh given the availability of immediate enforcement of the judg-
ment lien. Without redemption, the debtor has little protection
against the sale of his land at a price below its fair value.s2 The
threat of permanent loss of his land, however, may provide the
debtor with an incentive to satisfy the judgment.
Duratin of the Judgment Lien
Absent extension or reVival, a judgment is enforceable only for a
twenty-year period from the date it is rendered. 3 The continued
validity of a judgment lien during this period requires no action by
the creditor. If the statute of limitations has run, however, the
creditor either must bring his case within certain exceptions, prove
79. VA. CODE § 8.01-463 (Repl. Vol. 1977). To enforce a smaller judgment, the creditor
must give thirty days notice to the judgment debtor or his personal representative and to
the owner of the real estate on which the judgment is a lien. Id. See Sutherland v. Rasnake,
169 Va. 257, 263, 192 S.E. 695, 697 (1937) (notice is mandatory).
80. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.35.210 to .290 (1973); CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE §§ 700a, 702,
703 (West Cum. Supp. 1979), 701, 704-707 (West 1955); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 38-39-102
(Cum. Supp. 1978), -103 (1973); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 426.530, 426.540 (Baldwin 1972);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 236, § 33 (West 1959); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 550-25 (West 1947).
81. Other states without a redemption procedure include North Carolina, Maryland,
Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Texas, Florida, and Indiana.
82. This loss of protection is mitigated by statutes authorizing or requiring the fixing of
minimum sale prices to avoid judicial upset of the sale. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-37-1
(Burns 1973); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-339.64 to 339.67 (Repl. Vol. 1969) (providing for
reauctioning at higher prices). Virginia does not grant by statute such a judicial avoidance
power. The court, however, has discretion to confirm a sale or to set aside the sale if the sale
price is grossly inadequate. See, e.g., O.K. Warehouse v. West, 151 Va. 809, 812, 145 S.E.
253, 254 (1928); Virginia Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Cottrell, 85 Va. 857, 861, 9 S.E. 132, 133
(1899).
83. VA. CODE § 8.01-251(A) (Repl Vol. 1977). Section 8.01-251 applies to judgment after
June 29, 1948 and to judgments before that date that are not yet barred. Id. § 8.01-251(E).
Whether enforcement of a judgment lien is barred by the statute of limitation on the life
of the judgment was decided affirmatively in the leading case of Hutcheson v. Grubbs, 80
Va. 251, 258 (1885). See Flanary v. Kane, 102 Va. 547, 557, 46 S.E. 312, 315 (1904).
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that running of the statute was tolled, or seek an extension before
he can maintain a creditor's bill.
Despite the running of the twenty-year limitation, a judgment
lien is enforceable if the debt is secured by a mortgage, deed of
trust, or vendor's lien 4 or if the debtor executed a written promise
based on valuable consideration to pay the judgment.8 5 Also, al-
though enforcement is barred against a principal, the creditor may
enforce the judgment against the surety 86
The Virginia duration statute contains the following tolling pro-
vision: "In computing the time, any time during which the right to
sue out execution on the judgment is suspended by the terms
thereof, or by legal process, shall be omitted. '87 An order of refer-
ence for an accounting of judgment liens tolls running of the stat-
ute of limitations as to all judgment creditors who prove their lien
under the order."" A decree that suspends execution also suspends
the statute, 9 but an agreement between the parties- prohibiting ex-
ecution does not toll the statute.90 A creditor who initiates a credi-
tor's bill to enforce his lien thereby tolls the statute's running as to
creditors and property in the suit.9 1 Whether a debtor's absence
from the state tolls the statute, however, is unclear.2 Appeal of the
84. See Paxton v. Rich, 85 Va. 378, 383, 7 S.E. 531, 533 (1888) (a lien of a judgment based
on a mortgage, deed of trust, or vendor's lien does not grow out of the judgment itself but is
collateral to it and may be enforced in equity although the judgment is barred at law).
85. See Bradshaw v. Bratton, 96 Va. 577, 582, 32 S.E. 56, 58 (1899) (involving a debtor's
charge that the judgment by confession was fraudulently obtained when creditor repre-
sented that a barred lien still attached to debtor's property).
86. A judgment recovered against both the principal and surety will be a valid lien against
the surety for the statutory period in § 8.01-251, even if the judgment is barred as to the
principal. Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Lackland, 175 Va. 178, 187, 8 S.E.2d 306, 309 (1940); Man-
son v. Rawlings' Ex'rs, 112 Va. 384, 388, 71 S.E. 564, 566 (1911) (judgment barred against
deceased principal still enforceable for remainder of surety's limitation period).
87. VA. CODE § 8.01-251(D) (Repl Vol. 1977).
88. See Gunnell's Adm'rs v. Dixon's Adm'x, 101 Va. 174, 180, 43 S.E. 340, 342 (1903).
89. Davis v. Roller, 106 Va. 46, 50-51, 55 S.E. 4, 6 (1906).
90. Exceptions to the operation of the statute of limitations must be found in the statute
itself, and the language does not mention agreements not to execute. Clark v. Nave's Credi-
tors, 116 Va. 838, 841, 83 S.E. 547, 548 (1914). Contra, Fulkerson v. Taylor, 100 Va. 426, 435,
41 S.E. 863, 866 (1902) (execution issued on unconditional decree for money, in contraven-
tion of parties' agreement, is voidable only and is sufficient to toll the statute of limitations).
91. Blair v. Rorer's Adm'r, 135 Va. 1, 17, 116 S.E. 767, 773 (1923).
92. Prior to the revision of the Virginia Code resulting in Title 8.01, a debtor's absence
from the state tolled the running of the statute of limitations except for suits to enforce
judgment liens. VA. CODE §§ 8-33, -393 (Repl. Vol. 1957) (repealed 1977); see Duffy v. Har-
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judgment, 3 sale by the debtor of realty subject to the lien,94 and
death of a party do not toll the statute.95
A creditor or his assignee may prevent expiration of his judg-
ment lien by making a motion to extend the judgment within the
twenty-year period from the date of the original judgment or from
the latest extension.96 The motion must be filed in the Virginia
court that rendered the judgment and must be accompanied by no-
tice to the debtor.9 7 Following an order to show cause why exten-
sion should not be permitted and a hearing on the motion, the
court will grant the extension.98 Under this procedure, a creditor
may obtain an unlimited number of extensions against a living
judgment debtor.9 Once a judgment has been extended, it must be
redocketed to create a lien.100 The lien then relates back to the
date of the original docketing and thus retains its priority.10 1
A judgment creditor who dockets his judgment before the death
of the debtor may subject the decedent's realty to the lien. This is
done without reviving the judgment after the debtor's death by
bringing a creditor's bill against the decedent's personal represen-
tative, devisees, or heirs. 02 A recent revision of the Virginia
stock, 137 Va. 406, 46 S.E.2d 570 (1948). The new § 8.01-229(D) carries forward the suspen-
sion of limitation for the debtor's absence but does not specifically except enforcement of
judgment hens. Id. Section 8.01-229(H), however, does provide for the tolling of the statute
of limitations in lien creditors' suits under certain circumstances but makes no mention of
the debtor's absence. Likewise, § 8.01-251 which, according to the Reviser's notes following
the statute, consolidates several old sections including § 8-393 does not provide for the
debtor's absence to effect the statute of limitations. Therefore, it is unclear whether the
debtor's absence does toll the statute with respect to judgment Hens.
93. See Seal v. Puckett, 159 Va. 297, 303, 165 S.E. 496, 498 (1932).
94. See Brown v. Butler, 87 Va. 621, 626, 13 S.E. 71, 72 (1891).
95. VA. CODE § 8.01-229(B)(3) (Repl Vol. 1977). See Barley v. Duncan, 177 Va. 202, 203,
13 S.E.2d 298, 298 (1941).
96. VA. CODE § 8.01-251(B) (Repl. Vol. 1977). The motion for extension under this section
has replaced revival of a judgment by scire factas. Id. § 8.01-24.
97. Id. § 8.01-251(B).
98. Id.
99. McClanahan's Adm'r v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 122 Va. 705, 719, 96 S.E. 453, 473 (1918).
100. VA. CODE § 8.01-458 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
101. Id. The new judgment does not merge with the original judgment so as to defeat the
original lien; rather, the new judgment has the effect of renewing the old lien and therefore
preserving its priority. Hay v. Alexandria & W. R.R., 20 F 15, 27 (E.D. Va. 1884).
102. See James's Ex'r v. Lige, 92 Va. 702, 705, 24 S.E. 275, 277 (1896). See also Maxwell
v. Leeson, 50 W Va. 361, 40 S.E. 420 (1901).
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Code'0 3 eliminates the prior rule 0 4 requiring enforcement of the
judgment within five years from qualification of the deceased
debtor's personal representative. Although the new statute is silent
on the enforcement limitation, the normal twenty-year limitation
probably applies in this situation. Should the statute of limitation
run on a judgment against a decedent, the creditor must file the
motion for extension within two years from qualification of the
personal representative. 05 This extension is for two years from the
date the motion was filed, and only one such extension is al-
lowed. 10 6 These restrictions on extension conflict with the interpre-
tation that a judgment against a decedent now has a twenty-year
life; perhaps, therefore, the prior five-year limitation was omitted
erroneously
PRIORITIES UNDER STATE LAW
Priority Among Judgment Liens
Time of docekting is the key to determining priority among
judgment liens. The priority rules establish a race in which the
first judgment creditor to docket his judgment has a lien that takes
priority over all liens of later docketed judgments. 0 7 The effect of
priority is that the whole of the debtor's real estate in the county
where the judgments are docketed must be applied first to satisfy
the senior judgment lien. The lien of the next highest priority then
receives satisfaction from the residue, if any, and distribution con-
tinues until all liens are satisfied or the asset is fully distributed. 08
If judgment liens are of equal priority, 0 9 they share pro rata in
103. VA. CODE § 8.01-251 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
104. Id. § 8-396 (Cum. Supp. 1976) (repealed 1977).
105. Id. § 8.01-251(B) (Repl. Vol. 1977).
106. Id.
107. Id. § 8.01-459. See Buchanan v. Clark, 51 Va. (10 Gratt.) 164, 181 (1853).
108. This rule is based on cases interpreting the earlier priority system, under which judg-
ments were liens on the whole of the debtor's equitable estate. The present rule limiting the
effect of the lien to the jurisdiction where docketed does not effect the outcome. The whole
is applied first to the elder judgment and the residue to the junior judgment. Haleys v.
Williams, 28 Va. (I Leigh) 140, 142 (1829). See Buchanan v. Clark, 51 Va. (10 Gratt.) 164,
181 (1853); Withers v. Carter, 45 Va. (4 Gratt.) 407, 417 (1848).
109. If a judgment is divided and assigned to different creditors, one creditor may not
assert his lien to the prejudice of the others; the liens are of equal rank. Davis v. Roller, 106
Va. 46, 51, 55 S.E. 4, 6 (1906).
934 [Vol. 21:919
JUDGMENT LIENS AND PRIORITIES
foreclosure sale proceeds that are insufficient to satisfy fully all
such liens. 1 0
Priority of Judgment Liens on Property Transferred by Debtor
A major priority question is the judgment creditor's ability to
enforce his lien against transferees of the debtor's real estate. If a
debtor should sell land subject to a judgment lien, the judgment
creditor has no right to follow the proceeds of the sale; his only
remedy is against the real property to which his lien attaches."" As
a general rule, if a recordable instrument mortgaging,112 transfer-
ring, or assigmng the debtor's real property is recorded before the
judgment is docketed, then the innocent transferee for value under
the instrument enjoys priority over the subsequently acquired
judgment lien.
Four situations warrant consideration in determining a judgment
lien's priority with respect to real estate transferred by the debtor.
First, when the transferee purchases the real estate from the
debtor after the judgment lien is created, he takes the land subject
to the lien. Once the judgment is docketed, all subsequent trans-
ferees are considered to have notice of the lien and, therefore, are
junior to it.111 Second, a transfer by the debtor that is recorded
after the judgment is rendered but before it is docketed will defeat
the rights of the judgment creditor. In this situation, the judgment
creditor acquires no rights in the land because the debtor, having
transferred his interest before the lien arose, no longer has any in-
terest to which the lien may attach;11 4 the creditor can obtain no
110. Janney's Ex'r v. Stephen's Adm'r, 2 Pat. & H. 11, 23 (Va. 1856).
111. Orphanoudakis v. Orphanoudakis, 199 Va. 142, 150, 98 S.E.2d 676, 682 (1957); Jones
v. Hall, 177 Va. 658, 666, 15 S.E.2d 108, 111 (1941); Blackemore v. Wise, 95 Va. 269, 273, 28
S.E. 332, 333 (1897).
112. For a discussion of the judgment lien's priority with respect to mortgages, see notes
140-46 infra & accompanying text.
113. Sharitz v. Moyers, 99 Va. 519, 525, 39 S.E. 166, 168 (1901); Citizens Nat'l Bank v.
Manom, 76 Va. 802, 807 (1882); Redd v. Ramey, 72 Va. (31 Gratt.) 265, 267 (1879). See Hill
v. Rixey, 67 Va. (26 Gratt.) 72, 79 (1875). Similarly, if a judgment debtor transfers his land
between the rendering of a judgment and its affirmance on appeal, the land remains subject
to the original judgment lien. See Jeter v. Langhorne, 46 Va. (5 Gratt.) 193, 197 (1848);
M'Clung v. Beirne, 37 Va. (10 Leigh) 410, 416 (1839). As a practical matter, the purchaser of
land from the debtor may avoid loss by paying the judgment debt and thereby releasing the
lien.
114. See Bowman v. Hides, 80 Va. 806, 810 (1885). For the same reason, a judgment lien
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better rights to the debtor's lands than the debtor is shown to have
by the record of title.1 5 The third situation arises when the debtor
transfers the property and the transfer is recorded before judg-
ment. As in the second situation, because the transfer occurred
before docketing, the purchaser for value without notice and takes
the land free of the lien.I"8 Fourth, if the transfer occurs before the
judgment is rendered but the transfer is not recorded at the time
the judgment is docketed, the judgment lienor will prevail over the
transferee. This is simply an application of the recording act; be-
cause the transfer is unrecorded, record title remains in the debtor
and the lien attaches to the land at the time of docketing." 7
A judgment lien's priority also may come into conflict with a
contract for the sale of the land. An executory contract of sale be-
tween a debtor and a third party purchaser must be in writing"18
and recorded in the city or county where the property is located" 9
to be valid against lien creditors. Virginia law once recognized a
distinction between oral and written contracts of sale, holding that
the recording requirements did not apply to oral contracts for the
sale of land.120 The Virginia Code, however, resolved the conflict
between oral and written executory contracts by voiding oral real
does not attach to land of a vendee/debtor when the contract for sale of the land to the
debtor is rescinded prior to docketing of the judgment against him. Nelson v. Turner, 97 Va.
54, 58, 33 S.E. 390, 391 (1899).
115. Miller v. Kemp, 157 Va. 178, 190, 160 S.E. 203, 206 (1931); Nutt v. Summers, 78 Va.
164, 173 (1883); Floyd v. Harding, 69 Va. (28 Gratt.) 401, 407 (1877). See note 49 supra.
116. See Hill v. Rixey, 67 Va. (26 Gratt.) 72, 74 (1875). In Hill, a creditor recovered a
judgment in 1860 but did not docket it until 1868, while a second creditor obtained a judg-
ment in 1861 that was docketed in 1866. The debtor conveyed the land in trust in 1865 and
the deed was recorded in 1867. The second creditor's judgment lien took priority over the
subsequently recorded deed, but the taker under the deed took prior to the first creditor
because the deed was recorded before the first creditor docketed.
117. Flanary v. Kane, 102 Va. 547, 559, 46 S.E. 312, 316 (1904); Price v. Wall's Ex'r, 97
Va. 334, 336, 33 S.E. 599, 600 (1899); Blakemore v. Wise, 95 Va. 269, 273, 28 S.E. 332, 333
(1897); Campbell & Co. v. Nonpareil F.B. & K. Co., 75 Va. 291, 293 (1881); Young v.
Devries, 72 Va. (31 Gratt.) 304, 308 (1879); March, Price & Co. v. Chambers, 71 Va. (30)
Gratt.) 299, 303 (1878); Eidson v. Huff, 70 Va. (29 Gratt.) 338, 342 (1877).
118. VA. CODE § 11-1 (Repl. Vol. 1978).
119. Id. § 55-96 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
120. See McClanahan's Adm'r v. Norfolk & W Ry., 122 Va. 705, 711, 96 S.E. 453, 462
(1918); Fulkerson's Adm'x v. Taylor, 102 Va. 314, 319, 46 S.E. 309, 310 (1904); Floyd v.
Harding, 69 Va. (28 Gratt.) 401, 413 (1877). The distinction between oral and written con-
tracts was criticized for favoring oral contracts. See Straley v. Esser, 117 Va. 135, 142-43, 83
S.E. 1075, 1077-78 (1915).
JUDGMENT LIENS AND PRIORITIES
estate contracts as to subsequent purchasers for value and credi-
tors of the transferor. 121
Court decreed sales of the debtor's land and sales to satisfy a
junior lienor also raise priority problems. A purchaser at a judicial
sale takes good title against a judgment creditor of the grantor,
even if the deed of trust never has been recorded, provided all in-
terested parties are before the court.122 If land is sold to satisfy a
junior lienor, the purchaser takes the land subject to the senior
judgment lien.123
Because the judgment lien's priority depends upon docketing
before the recording of the debtor's transfer, the judgment creditor
should obtain the judgment and docket it as soon as possible,
thereby giving notice of the lien to purchasers from the debtor.
Before judgment, the creditor may secure his interest and give no-
tice by means of attachment or lis pendens.1 24 Lis pendens or at-
tachment binds a subsequent bona fide purchaser for value, other-
wise without notice, if there is
a memorandum setting forth the title of the cause or attach-
ment, the general object thereof, the court wherein it is pending,
the amount of the claim asserted by the plaintiff, a description
of the property, and the name of the person whose estate is in-
tended to be affected thereby.125
Once recorded and indexed m the circuit clerk's office where the
property is located,126 the attachment or lis pendens subordinates
the rights of a subsequent vendee who purchases the debtor's land
while a suit against the debtor is pending to the rights of the credi-
tor adjudicated in that suit.127 After a judgment is obtained, a pur-
121. VA. CODE § 11-1 (Repl. Vol. 1978).
122. See Campbell & Co. v. Nonpareil F.B. & K. Co., 75 Va. 291, 294 (1881) (this theory
suggests the purchaser holds under the decree not the deed of trust); Glazebrook's Adm'r v.
Bagland's Adm'r, 49 Va. (8 Gratt.) 332, 340 (1851).
123. Sexton's Ex'r v. Patterson, 1 Va. Dec. 551, 556 (1883)(error to direct payment of
junior judgment out of proceeds from foreclosure sale in preference to semor lien).
124. Pursuant to § 8.01-550, attachment of any real estate in accordance with require-
ments of §§ 8.01-268 and 8.01-557 creates a lien on the property from the time of levy. VA.
CODE § 8.01-550 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
125. Id. § 8.01-268.
126. Id.
127. Steinman v. Clinchfield Coal Corp., 121 Va. 611, 641, 93 S.E. 684, 694 (1917). Al-
though no memorandum is filed, a voluntary purchaser pendente lite takes in subordination
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chaser of the debtor's land is bound by a notice of docketed judg-
ment, and no lis pendens or attachment is necessary 128
Order of Liability Among Alienees of Debtor's Land
The Virginia Code establishes the order in which property con-
veyed by a debtor after commencement of a judgment lien is used
to satisfy the judgment.129 Real estate retained by the judgment
debtor will be applied first to satisfy the judgment. 3 ' If such lands
are insufficient, property conveyed by the debtor will be appropri-
ated, with the land last sold being liable first and so on in inverse
order of alienation until the judgment is satisfied."-' Imposed upon
this inverse order of liability is the rule that lands given away by
the debtor are liable before lands conveyed for value.13 2 A pur-
chaser for value from a donee, however, occupies the same position
as if he had purchased from the judgment debtor when he pur-
chased from the donee. 3 Real estate conveyed contemporaneously
is liable on a pro rata basis.'3
Priority of Judgment Lien on After-Acquired Property
In Virginia, the judgment lien extends to after-acquired real es-
to the rights of the grantor's creditor adjudicated in the suit. Davis v. Anderson, 99 Va. 620,
624, 39 S.E. 588, 590 (1901).
128. Sharitz v. Moyers, 99 Va. 519, 525, 39 S.E. 166, 168 (1901).
129. VA. CODE § 8.01-464 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
130. Id. See Blakemore v. Wise, 95 Va. 269, 273, 28 S.E. 332, 333 (1897); Dickinson v.
Clement, 87 Va. 41, 46, 12 S.E. 105, 107 (1890).
An alienee wishing to avoid liability must allege and prove that the debtor's lands are
more than sufficient to satisfy the lien. Preston v. National Exch. Bank, 97 Va. 222, 226, 33
S.E. 546, 547 (1899).
131. VA. CODE § 8.01-464 (Repl. Vol. 1977). See Nelson v. Turner, 97 Va. 54, 59, 33 S.E.
390, 391 (1899); Miller v. Holland, 84 Va. 652, 654, 5 S.E. 701, 702 (1888); Whitten v. Saun-
ders, 75 Va. 563, 567 (1881); Harman v. Oberdorfer, 74 Va. (33 Gratt.) 497, 501 (1880);
Shultz v. Hansbrough, 74 Va. (33 Gratt.) 567, 583 (1880). The date of the deed is presumed
to be the time of alienation. Harman v. Oberdorfer, 74 Va. (33 Gratt.) 497, 501 (1880);
Shultz v. Hansbrough, 74 Va. (33 Gratt.) 567, 583 (1880).
132. VA. CODE § 8.01-464 (Repl. Vol. 1977). Among donees of the debtor's land, the same
rule of inverse liability applies.
133. Id.
134. Harman v. Oberdorfer, 74 Va. (33 Gratt.) 497, 507 (1880) (if several lots are sold
same day on same terms to several purchasers, each lot is subject to judgment lien against
vendor in proportion to its relative value on day of sale); Alley v. Rogers, 60 Va. (19 Gratt.)
366, 391 (1896).
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tate of the judgment debtor. 135 Virginia, however, rejects the ma-
jority rule, which grants equal rank to all liens existing at the time
the land is acquired. Under the majority rule, existing liens attach
simultaneously to the after-acquired property regardless of the or-
der in which they were created; if the land is insufficient to satisfy
the liens, then the lienors, being of equal rank, share pro rata in
the distribution of proceeds from the sale.136 Virginia, takes the
minority position that the existing judgment liens attach to the
debtor's newly-acquired land in the order in which the judgments
originally were docketed.137 The priority among judgment liens on
the after-acquired property of the debtor, therefore, is the same as
that on property in which the debtor had an interest when the
judgment was docketed.
Consider the following example: creditor A recovers a judgment
against debtor D and dockets his judgment in October, 1977; in
October, 1978 creditor B who also has a judgment against D dock-
ets. Subsequently, D acquires Blackacre. According to the majority
view, both A and B would share ratably in the proceeds from the
sale of Blackacre because their liens attach simultaneously and are
of equal rank. In Virginia, however, A's lien would have to be satis-
fied completely before B would be able to share in any of the
proceeds.
Although the Code sections that establish the docketing prior-
ity138 do not address. specifically the question of after-acquired
property priorities, the conclusion that judgment liens attach to af-
ter-acquired property in the order in which they are docketed is
implicit in the statutory language. 3 9 Virginia's position suggests a
misguided expression of the diligence policy that awards priority to
the creditor who dockets his judgment first. No matter how dili-
135. See Gordon v. Rixey, 76 Va. 694, 698 (1882).
136. VA. CODE § 55-96 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
137. The judgment lienor acquires only the rights the debtor has in the real estate and
takes subject to the deed of trust. See C.B. Van Nostrand & Co. v. Virginia Zinc & Chem.
Corp., 126 Va. 131, 139, 101 S.E. 65, 68 (1919).
138. VA. CODE § 8.01-458, -459 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
139. Holland Jones Co. v. Smith, 152 Va. 707, 711, 148 S.E. 581, 582 (1929); Moomaw v.
Jordan, 118 Va. 414, 416, 87 S.E. 569, 570 (1916); Charlottesville Hardware Co. v. Perkins,
118 Va. 34, 38, 86 S.E. 869, 870 (1915) (quoting Summers v. Dame, 72 Va. (31 Gratt.) 791,
801 (1879)); Strauss v. Bodeker's Ex'r, 86 Va. 543, 548, 10 S.E. 570, 572 (1889) (quoting
Summers v. Dane, 72 Va. (31 Gratt.) 791, 801 (1879)).
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gent the judgment creditor is, his lien cannot encumber property
the debtor does not own. The majority approach is preferable be-
cause it treats prior judgment liens equally with respect to after-
acquired lands on which none of the lienors would have relied in
extending credit or docketing their judgment.
Priority of Judgment Liens on Property Subject to Deeds of Trust
or Mortgages
Land on which a judgment lien is created often will be subject to
a deed of trust or mortgage held by a third person. Creditors and
trustees secured by deed of trust or mortgages are considered pur-
chasers for value140 who must record the security instrument"" to
take priority over subsequent judgment liens.142 Land acquired by
the debtor after a judgment lien has commenced is subject to the
lien. 43 If the debtor finances the purchase of land by giving a
mortgage or a deed of trust, the mortgagee's or trustee's interest
takes priority over the earlier judgment lien on a theory of transi-
tory seisin.144 In the typical deed of trust or mortgage acquisition,
the purchaser-debtor theoretically receives the land and immedi-
ately reconveys it to the trustee or mortgagee to secure the
purchase money Therefore, seisin never actually rests in the pur-
140. See Gordon v. Rixey, 76 Va. 694, 698 (1882).
141. Straley v. Esser, 117 Va. 135, 145, 83 S.E. 1075, 1078 (1915). If only part of the
purchase money is from a third party, the judgment creditor may subject the debtor's por-
tion in the land to the judgment lien. Sinclair v. Sinclair, 79 Va. 40, 42 (1884).
142. VA. CODE § 8.01-458 (Repl. Vol. 1977). See Brockenbrough v. Brockenbrough, 72 Va.
(31 Gratt.) 580, 593 (1879); Hill v. Manser, 52 Va. (11 Gratt.) 522, 525 (1854). A judgment is
also a lien on the after-acquired vested remainder of a judgment debtor. Wilson v. Lang-
home, 102 Va. 631, 642, 47 S.E. 871, 875 (1904).
143. See, e.g., Hertweck v. Fearon, 180 Cal. 71, 179 P 190 (1919); Cayce v. Stovall, 50
Miss. 396 (1874); Hulbert v. Hulbert, 216 N.Y. 430, 111 N.E. 70 (1916); Summers Hardware
Co. v. Jones, 222 N.C. 530, 23 S.E.2d 883 (1943); Belknap v. Greene, 56 S.C. 119, 34 S.E. 26
(1899); Matula'v. Lane, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 391, 55 S.W 504 (1900). Among the jurisdictions
adopting this majority view, a number award priority among the equal lienors to the diligent
creditor who first forces sale under his lien. See Smith v. Lind, 29 Ill. 24 (1862); Bradley v.
Heffernan, 156 Mo. 653, 57 S.W. 763 (1900). Other jurisdictions hold that the diligent credi-
tor's foreclosure does not destroy the equal rank of the liens and proceeds from the sale are
distributed pro rata. See Hulbert v. Hulbert, 216 N.Y. 430, 111 N.E. 70 (1916); Moore v.
Jordan, 117 N.C. 86, 23 S.E. 259 (1895).
144. VA. CODE § 8.01-458 (Repl. Vol. 1977). See M. BURKS, supra note 8, § 349 (4th ed.
Supp. 1961). Burks cites no authority except Virginia Code § 8-386, now 8.01-458.
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chaser-debtor, and the judgment lien cannot attach.145 Even
though the debtor gets legal title when the purchase price is paid
by another, the debtor has no beneficial interest in the land to
which the judgment can attach. 146
Attachment as a Means of Enhancing Priority
If a creditor takes out a writ of attachment that is levied and
recorded before judgment,147 the subsequent judgment lien merges
with the attachment lien and the date of the judgment lien relates
back to the attachment.148 The judgment lien has priority as of the
date of attachment against bona fide purchasers of the attached
land 49 and against other judgment creditors.150 For example, cred-
itor A, who brings an action against the defendant and levies at-
tachment on specific property of the defendant, will prevail over
creditor B, who obtains and dockets a judgment prior to creditor
A's obtaining a judgment, if A's attachment occurs before B's
docketing. A's inchoate attachment lien becomes choate upon
judgment, and upon docketing, A's judgment lien merges with the
attachment lien to date the lien from the time of attachment.
145. See VA. CODE §§ 8.01-458, -459 (Repl. Vol. 1977); M. BURKS, supra note 8, § 349 (4th
ed. Supp. 1961).
146. Section 8.01-458 provides that money judgments shall be liens on real estate that the
defendant owns or later acquires "from the time such judgment is recorded." The section
can be read to mean that the lien commences and therefore attaches to the after-acquired
property at the time the judgment is recorded. This interpretation supports the theory that
priority is established by the order in which the judgments are docketed. This language also
can be construed to mean that the judgment is a lien on the debtor's real estate, including
that subsequently acquired, but not until it is docketed.
Section 8.01-459 provides "[J]udgments against the same person shall, as among them-
selves, attach to his real estate, and be payable thereout in the order of the priority of the
lien of such judgments respectively." The phrase "in the order of the priority of the Hen of
such judgments," means in the order in which the judgments were docketed. No distinction
is made in the section between real estate owned at the time of docketing the judgment and
that subsequently acquired. If it includes after-acquired property, Burks' interpretation is
in accord with § 8.01-459. See note 144 supra. If the term "real estate" is limited to that in
which the debtor has an attachable interest at the time the judgment lien commences, then
how the priority rules apply to after-acquired property is unclear.
147. VA. CODE § 8.01-557 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
148. Trimble v. Covington Grocery Co., 112 Va. 826, 833, 72 S.E. 724, 726 (1911).
149. See text accompanying notes 124-27 supra.
150. VA. CODE § 8.01-557 (Repl. Vol. 1977). 31 U.S.C.A. § 191 (West Supp. 1979). I.R.C.
§§ 6321-6323.
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FEDERAL PRIORITIES
The Federal Tax Lien
Internal Revenue Code sections 6321 to 6323 contain federal tax
lien priority provisions. 151 Under section 6321, an assessed federal
tax constitutes a lien in the government's favor on all real and per-
sonal property of the delinquent taxpayer. 152 In most instances, the
federal government's tax lien defeats the claim of a private credi-
tor. Section 6323(a), however, protects certain creditors of the de-
linquent taxpayer by providing that the federal tax lien "shall not
be valid as against any purchaser, holder of a security interest,
mechanic's lienor, or judgment lien creditor" whose interest arises
before notice of the tax lien is filed in the office designated by state
law for the recordation of liens against realty 153
In Virginia, tax liens are docketed in the clerk's office of the cir-
cuit court in which the land is located.'" Notice of the tax lien also
must be indexed in a public index of liens maintained in the Inter-
nal Revenue Service office for the district where the property is
situated.155 State law determines whether and to what extent the
taxpayer has property or a right to property to which a federal tax
lien can attach.'56
Section 6323(a) bases priority on the traditional rule of first in
time; if the judgment lien is created before the federal tax lien, it
151. Title 31, § 191 of the United States Code also creates a federal priority for tax debts
owed the United States. See text accompanying notes 171-75 infra. For a thorough treat-
ment of the federal tax lien, see W PLUMB, THE FEDERAL TAX LIEN (3d ed. 1972).
152. I.R.C. §§ 6321-6323; Treas. Reg. § 301.6321-1 (1971). The lien on property of a tax-
payer who refuses or neglects to pay his federal taxes also embraces after-acquired property.
The lien is valid against the taxpayer's property interests from the time the deficiency as-
sessment is made. Virginia courts also recognize the priority of a state tax lien over a judg-
ment lien. See Stevenson v. Henkle, 100 Va. 591, 598, 42 S.E. 672, 675 (1902); Thomas v.
Jones, 94 Va. 756, 759, 27 S.E. 813, 814 (1897); Simmons v. Lyle's Adm'r, 73 Va. (32 Gratt.)
752, 761 (1880).
153. I.R.C. §§ 6323(a), (f)(1)(A)(i). The liens listed in § 6323(a) have priority over the
federal tax lien even if they are inchoate under the test announced in Illinois ex rel. Gordon
v. Campbell, 327 U.S. 362 (1946). See notes 163-64 infra & accompanying text. Liens that
are not listed, such as attachment liens, are not protected because of their inchoate nature.
United States v. Security Trust & Say. Bank, 340 U.S. 47, 52-53 (1950) (Jackson J.,
concurring).
154. VA. CODE § 8.01-446 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
155. I.R.C. § 6323(0(4).
156. Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509, 515-16 (1960).
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takes priority Relation back theories will not alter this result, so
the relation back of the judgment lien to a prior date of attach-
ment cannot defeat a tax lien filed after attachment but prior to
recovery and docketing of the judgment.157
Revised Statute 3466 Preference
In addition to the priority of a federal tax lien, the federal gov-
ernment's claims receive preference over claims of other creditors
pursuant to the federal priority provision of the United States
Code, commonly referred to as section 3466.158 Section 3466 ap-
plies to all debts owed the United States, including debts from fed-
eral contracts, guarantees, taxes, direct loans, and other claims.
The statute provides as follows:
Whenever any person indebted to the United States is insol-
vent, or whenever the estate of any deceased debtor, in the
hands of the executors or administrators, is insufficient to pay
all the debts due from the deceased, the debts due to the United
States shall be first satisfied; and the priority established shall
extend as well to cases in which a debtor, not having sufficient
property to pay all his debts, makes a voluntary assignment
thereof, or in which the estate and effects of an absconding, con-
cealed, or absent debtor are attached by process of law, as to
cases in which an act of bankruptcy is committed. The priority
established under this section does not apply, however, in a case
under title 11 [bankruptcy].259
The statute creates an absolute priority in favor of the United
States whenever the debtor is insolvent60 or the decedent debtor's
estate is insufficient to satisfy the government claim. The courts
have limited section 3466, however, by recogmzing administrative
expenses16 ' and specific and perfected liens ' 2 as superior to federal
157. United States v. Acri, 348 U.S. 211, 213 (1955); United States v. Security Trust &
Say. Bank, 340 U.S. 47, 50 (1950).
158. 31 U.S.C.A. § 191 (West Supp. 1979).
159. Id.
160. See note 177 infra & accompanying text.
161. See, e.g., United States v. Weisburn, 48 F Supp. 393, 397 (E.D. Pa. 1943); Hammond
v. Carthage Sulphite Pulp & Paper Co., 34 F.2d 155, 156 (N.D.N.Y. 1928).
162. See United States v. Gilbert Assocs., 345 U.S. 361, 365-66 (1953); Illinois ex rel.
Gordon Campbell, 329 U.S. 362, 375 (1946); United States v. Haddix & Sons, 252 F Supp.
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claims if these expenses or liens arise before the debt owed the
government.
In Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. Campbell,1 63 the Supreme Court es-
tablished a three-point test for determining whether a lien is
choate, that is, specific and perfected, when the federal lien arises.
The Court required the creditor's lien to be definite, not merely
ascertainable m the future, as to the identity of the lienor, the
amount of the lien, and the property to which it attaches."" In
United States v. Gilbert Associates,65 the Supreme Court added
another criterion for determining whether a lien is specific and
perfected; specifically, title and possession to the claimed property
no longer must be in the debtor.166 Because judgment liens encum-
ber all the debtor's real estate and do not remove title and posses-
sion from the debtor until enforcement against specific lands, an
unenforced judgment lien is inchoate and inferior to a federal
claim. 167
Since Campbell, the Supreme Court has not found a lien to be
choate for purposes of section 3466, leaving unanswered whether
any lien ever can be sufficiently specific and perfected to defeat the
federal priority 16' The lower federal courts, however, have recog-
nized certain liens as prior to federal claims in insolvency proceed-
mgs, including mortgages 69 and liens of creditors who have levied
634, 636 (E.D. Mich. 1966).
163. 329 U.S. 362 (1946).
164. Id. at 375 (citations omitted) (state statutory lien for unemployment contributions
found not specific or perfected).
165. 345 U.S. 361 (1953).
166. Id. at 366. In Thelusson v. Smith, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 396, 425 (1817), the Court
reasoned that the debtor held no interest in land that could be subject to the federal claim
if the debtor was divested of title and possession. See United States v. Sullivan, 19 F Supp.
695, 700 (W.D.N.Y. 1937), afl'd, 95 F.2d 1021 (2d Cir. 1938) (a bona fide transfer, pledge, or
levy of execution on judgment removes property from effect of federal preference § 3466).
167. See United States v. Duncan, 25 F Cas. 927, 935 (C.C.D. Ill. 1850) (federal priority
does not supersede judgment perfected by execution and levy on real estate).
168. See, e.g., United States v. Vermont, 377 U.S. 351, 358 (1964) (dictum that in § 3466
proceeding Vermont state tax lien would be subject to federal priority); United States v.
Gilbert Assocs., 345 U.S. 361 (1953) (town taxes inferior). See also Plumb, The Federal
Priority in Insolvency, Proposals for Reform, 70 MicH. L. REv. 3, 4 (1971).
169. See, e.g., United States v. Guaranty Trust Co., 33 F.2d 533 (8th Cir. 1929), aff'd, 280
U.S. 478 (1930); United States v. Boston & Berlin Transp. Co., 237 F Supp. 1004 (D.N.H.
1964).
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on property and taken possession of the property 170
A California federal district court in Nesbitt v. Umted States,171
recently held that the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966 and Internal
Revenue Code section 6323(a) do not create an exception to the
governmental priority established by section 3466.172 Accordingly,
a judgment lien must be choate under the criteria established in
Campbell and Gilbert Associates to defeat a federal tax claim. The
logic of the court's holding in Nesbitt is questionable. Little reason
is apparent for section 6323(a) to specifically exempt judgment
liens from the tax lien priority scheme if section 3466 overrides it.
Section 6323(a) is the federal equivalent of a recording statute. Its
aim is to protect the interests of potential purchasers, lenders, and
judgment creditors of the debtor by requiring that before investing
or deciding to sue for a debt, they be given notice of the federal tax
lien.1 73 The notice requirement has little value, however, to a judg-
ment creditor who has enforced the Hen in a foreclosure sale; at
that point, the debtor has no interest to which the federal tax Hen
can attach.
Other courts have not followed the Nesbitt decision. Pre-Nesbitt
Supreme Court cases recognized that the federal priority issue in
insolvency proceedings differs from a judgment lienor's status
under sections 6321 to 6323 of the Internal Revenue Code.7 As
the Second Circuit noted in the bankruptcy context, section 6323
is an exception to the federal government's section 3466 priority in
state insolvency proceedings. 7 5 The important point is that judg-
ment liens are treated differently in regard to federal tax Hens and
need not be choate to prevail, as they must be to defeat other fed-
eral claims under section 3466.
Whether the Supreme Court will follow Nesbitt is uncertain.
What is clear is that few, if any, state liens will prevail over section
170. Ideco Div. of Dresser Indus. v. Chance Drilling Co., 309 F Supp. 305, 311-12 (S.D.
Tex. 1968), aff'd, 422 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1970) (mechanic's lien); United States v. Anthony,
231 F. Supp. 414, 422 (S.D. Iowa 1964) (note secured by chattel mortgage).
171. 445 F Supp. 824 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
172. Id. at 827-30.
173. 49 CONG. REC. 1802 (1913).
174. See United States v. Vermont, 377 U.S. 351, 358 (1964); United States v. City of
New Britain, 347 U.S. 81, 86-88 (1954).
175. In re Caswell Constr. Co., 13 F.2d 667, 670 (N.D.N.Y. 1926) (mechanic's lienor's peti-
tion to bankruptcy trustee for priority over federal claim).
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3466. In United States v. Oklahoma,7 6 the Court limited section
3466 government priority by restricting the definition of "insol-
vency" The Court held that something more than insolvency in
the bankruptcy sense, debts in excess of assets, will be required;
rather, the debtor must manifest insolvency in one of the three
forms specified in section 3466: by assignment, by having his ef-
fects attached after absconding, concealing, or absenting himself,
or by committing an act of bankruptcy 177
Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,178 the judgment creditor
fared better against section 3466 claims if the debtor went into
bankruptcy For example, if the debtor committed an act of bank-
ruptcy,1 9 such as making a general assignment for the benefit of
creditors, section 3466 insolvency was triggered. The judgment
lien, being a general lien on all the debtor's property, was inchoate
because it was not sufficiently definite as to the property to which
it attached. Therefore, the lien would be subordinate to the federal
claim. On the other hand, if the debtor filed a bankruptcy petition,
then the lien would have to be satisfied in full before any pay-
ments would be made to the government as a general creditor with
a priority 180 The 1978 Bankruptcy Code'81 has the same effect.
Under section 507, federal taxes are relegated to sixth priority and
government nontax claims become general claims against the es-
tate.18 2 Consequently, the lien creditor is encouraged to commence
176. 261 U.S. 253 (1923).
177. Id. at 260-61; 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(26) (West Supp. 1979). The Court in Oklahoma
required insolvency to be manifested by assignment, attachment of the debtor's effects after
he has absconded, or an act of bankruptcy. 261 U.S. at 261. See also Thelusson v. Smith, 15
U.S. (2 Wheat.) 396, 400 (1817).
178. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, §§ 1 - 74, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1 - 112 (1970) (repealed 1978).
179. Section 3(a) of 1898 Act states that a person commits an act of bankruptcy when he
does the following: 1) makes a fraudulent conveyance or concealment of his property; 2)
makes a preferential transfer; 3) permits, while insolvent, the creditor to obtain a lien on his
property then fails to discharge the lien within 30 days or 5 days before the sale of the
property; 4) makes a general assignment for the benefit of creditors; 5) allowed receiver to
be appointed to take charge of his property while he is insolvent; 6) admits inability to pay
his debts and expresses a willingness to be adjudged a bankrupt. 11 U.S.C. § 21 (1970)
(repealed 1978). The 1978 Code does not contain this section.
180. See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 64, 11 U.S.C. § 104 (1970) (repealed 1978). See also
D. EPSTEIN, DEBTOR-CREDITOR RELATIONS IN A NUTSHELL 83-87 (1973).
181. 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-2256 (West Supp. 1979).
182. Id. §§ 502, 507. Without special priority under § 507, the nontax debt owed the gov-
ernment must be satisfied out of the assets of the estate available to general claimants
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involuntary bankruptcy1 83 against a debtor who also is liable for a
federal claim under section 3466.
Circuity of Priority Problems
The federal priority scheme embodied in section 3466184 and the
Federal Tax Lien Act 185 is superimposed on the state priority sys-
tem. This may result in a circuity of priority problem. Suppose the
debtor has three creditors: the federal government and two claim-
ants under state law. State law provides that as between state
liens, that first in time has priority. Under the federal scheme, the
priority of a state lien vis-a-vis the federal claim depends on the
choateness of the state lien. If only the junior state lien is choate,
then the federal claim defeats the senior state lien but is subject to
the junior state lien. When the debtor's assets are insufficient to
satisfy all three claims, distribution becomes a problem.
In United States v. City of New Britain,18 the Supreme Court
resolved the problem by establishing a two-step analysis.8 7 First,
the total amount of claims that takes prior to the government
under federal law is set aside. State priority law determines how
this is to be divided among the claimants. The government is enti-
tled to the remaining portion, if any. For purposes of illustration,
consider the following example. Debtor's total assets equal $1500,
the senior state lien is for $300, the junior lien is for $400, and the
federal claim is $2,000. Because the junior lien is choate but the
senior lien is not under federal law, only $400 is set aside. Out of
the $400, however, state law awards $300 to the senior lienor and
the $100 balance to the junior lienor. The remaining $1100 goes to
the government.
JUDGMENT LIENS UNDER THE NEW BANKRuPTcY CODE
The Automatic Stay
Bankruptcy has the effect of superseding pending state actions
under § 502.
183. Id. § 303.
184. 31 U.S.C.A. § 191 (West Supp. 1979).
185. I.R.C. §§ 6321-6323.
186. 347 U.S. 81 (1954).
187. Id. at 86-88.
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and permits the bankruptcy trustee to invalidate much that was
done in the state proceedings.""' Section 362 of the Bankruptcy
Code of 1978189 provides an automatic stay of all creditors' enforce-
ment efforts against the bankrupt or persons indebted to the bank-
rupt.190 Sections 362(a)(2) through 362(a)(5) stay any creation,
perfection, or enforcement of a judgment, or the lien created by it,
against property of the bankrupt or of the estate.191 Thus, the stay,
applicable to all types of bankruptcy cases,'92 allows the court to
conduct a bankruptcy proceeding without piecemeal outside
litigation. 9 3
Bankruptcy does not discharge a valid judgment lien obtained
more than ninety days before filing of the bankruptcy petition. 94
Due to the automatic stay, however, the lienor may not initiate
enforcement proceedings without the bankruptcy court's permis-
sion.19 5 The bankruptcy court may terminate or modify the auto-
matic stay for cause, such as lack of adequate protection of the
secured interest l'9 or lack of any equity in property deemed unnec-
188. See notes 211-32 infra & accompanying text.
189. Pub. L. No. 598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified at 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-2256 (West
Supp. 1979)).
190. 11 U.S.C.A. § 362 (West Supp. 1979). The justification for staying actions against
debtors of the bankrupt is that all property owned by or owed to the bankrupt becomes
property of the bankruptcy estate. See id. § 541.
191. Id. §§ 362(a)(2) - §§ 362(c)(2)-(a)(5).
192. The stay covers liquidations, reorganizations, repayment plan cases, and municipal
debt adjustments. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 174, reprinted in [1978] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6135.
193. The 1898 Act used the stay of suits against the bankrupt to permit the bankruptcy
court to handle more effectively the bankrupt's debts by requiring all claims to be decided
by the bankruptcy court. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 11 U.S.C. § 614 (1970) (repealed 1978).
See Kennison v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 38 F Supp. 980, 982 (D. Minn.
1940).
194. Although a judgment is recovered within the ninety-day period, the lien on the bank-
rupt's property is not invalidated by the 1978 Code if the creditor's action was commenced
prior to that period. See Metcalf v. Barker, 187 U.S. 165, 174 (1902) (dealing with the 1898
Act and its four-month preference period).
195. See Straton v. New, 283 U.S. 318, 321-22 (1931) (dealing with former § 614, the
automatic stay provision of the 1898 Act, and the four-month rule); New River Coal Land
Co. v. Ruffner Bros., 165 F 881, 887-88 (4th Cir. 1908) (under 1898 Act, bankruptcy courts
could enjoin state foreclosure and lien enforcement proceedings and forbid state officers
from executing judgment).
196. 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(d)(1) (West Supp. 1979). The bankruptcy trustee has a duty to
protect adequately the secured property. See id. §§ 361-364.
948
JUDGMENT LIENS AND PRIORITIES
essary for the debtor's reorganization. 197 A judgment lienor there-
fore may request termination of the automatic stay in order to pro-
ceed with enforcement of his lien in state court.198
Status of a Judgment Lienor
The 1898 Bankruptcy Act treated the creditor with a judgment
lien on property in the bankrupt estate as a secured creditor whose
claim took priority over that of an unsecured creditor." Under the
Bankruptcy Code of 1978, a judgment lienor whose lien cannot be
avoided by the bankruptcy trustee is likewise a secured creditor.
To retain the advantage of his lienor status, however, the creditor
must file a claim as a secured creditor pursuant to section 501.20
As a secured claim, a valid20 ' judgment lien takes priority in the
bankruptcy distribution; the trustee must satisfy the judgment lien
to the extent of the realty securing the lien before any payments
are made to general creditors or creditors with section 507 prior-
ity 20 2 Although the 1978 Code does not state expressly this pro-
position, it is implicit in section 507(b). Section 507(a) establishes
the general order of priority in distribution. If a secured claim, en-
titled to adequate protection under the. 1978 Code203 does not re-
ceive such protection, section 507(b) grants that claim priority over
every other allowable claim, including those given special priority
197. Id. § 362(d)(2).
198. If the validity of the lien is established and the amount of the lien exceeds the value
of the security to the estate, the court will grant the request for relief. For a discussion of
the automatic stay and an overview of the 1978 Code, see Klein, The Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978, 53 Am. BANKR. L.J. 1, 20 (1979); Rendleman, Liquidation Bankruptcy Under
the '78 Code, supra this issue.
199. See Straton v. New, 283 U.S. 318 (1931). In Straton, the Supreme Court recognized
that bankruptcy law contained "no express provision preserving Hens acquired by legal pro-
ceedings more than four months before the petition was filed." Id. at 322. The Court con-
cluded, however, that the secured status of a lienor followed by implicaton from the fact
that § 67(f) "voids only liens obtained by legal proceedings within [the four month] period."
Id.
200. 11 U.S.C.A. § 501 (West Supp. 1979); see S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5,
reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787, 5791. For discussion of the bank-
ruptcy court's jurisdiction over assets subject to secured claims, see Isaacs v. Hobbs Tie &
Timber Co., 282 U.S. 734, 737-38 (1931).
201. A valid lien here refers to a lien not subject to attack under the various avoidance
provisions. See notes 202-29 infra & accompanying text.
202. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 507(b) (West Supp. 1979) (by implication).
203. See id. §§ 361-364.
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in section 507(a).2"4 Claims fully secured by valid liens thus pass
through bankruptcy unaffected unless the claim is diallowed under
section 502.205 A valid judgment lien, however, remains junior to
valid senior liens as determined under state law and accordingly
takes in distribution of the secured asset.20 6
Section 506 of the 1978 Code focuses on the status of under-
secured creditor. 0 The undersecured creditor has a secured claim
to the extent of the value of his collateral and an unsecured gen-
eral claim for the balance.20 8 Therefore, if a judgment lienor's
claim exceeds the value of the realty subject to his lien, he has a
secured claim to the extent of the land value and an unsecured
general claim for the remainder. Section 506(b) entitles an over-
secured creditor, such as a judgment lienor whose claims is less
than the value of realty subject to his lien, to interest on the claim
and any reasonable fees, costs, or charges based on the agreement
giving rise to it. 20 9 Any part of the security in excess of the allowa-
ble claim goes to the bankruptcy trustee for the benefit of general
creditors.210
Invalidating the Judgment Lien
Several provisons of the 1978 Code give the trustee or the bank-
rupt debtor power to invalidate a judgment lien on property in the
bankrupt estate. Section 544(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, the
"strong arm clause," gives the trustee the powers of a day of bank-
204. Id. § 507(b); see 95 CONG. REc. H11,095 (daily ed. Sep. 28, 1978).
205. 11 U.S.C.A. § 506(d) (West Supp. 1979); see id. §§ 502(d), (e). Section 502 deals with
the allowability of claims. Of particular interest to the judgment lienor is § 502(d), which
disallows claims that the trustee may invalidate under the various avoidance provisions. See
id. §§ 522, 544, 545, 547, 548, 549.
206. See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 192, at 357, reprinted in AD. NEWS, supra note
192, at 6313.
207. 11 U.S.C.A. § 506 (West Supp. 1979).
208. Id. § 506(a). See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 192, at 356, reprinted in AD. NEWS,
supra note 192, at 6311.
209. 11 U.S.C.A. § 506(b) (West Supp. 1979). See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 192, at
356, reprinted in AD. NEWS, supra note 192, at 6311.
210. Oldden v. Tonto Realty Corp., 143 F.2d 916, 921 (2d Cir. 1944). The trustee also may
recover expenses of preserving or disposing of property securing an allowed claim. 11
U.S.C.A. § 506(c) (West Supp. 1979). The legislative history adds that such expenses are
allowed if the value of property exceeds the sum of these claims. See H.R. REP. No. 595,
supra note 192, at 357, reprinted in AD. NEWS, supra note 192, at 6313.
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ruptcy judgment creditor or bona fide purchaser.2 11 The policy of
this section is to prevent unperfected security interests from de-
feating the claims of general creditors by allowing the trustee, as a
hypothetical judgment creditor or purchaser, to use state law to
avoid the off-record transfer. Because the 1978 Code defines
"transfer" to include an involuntary disposition of an interest in
property, 12 a judgment lien potentially is subject to avoidance as
an off-record transfer if perfected or docketed after the bankruptcy
petition is filed.
Section 544(a)(1) gives the trustee the power of a hypothetical
creditor with a judicial lien 13 commencing on the date the bank-
ruptcy petition is filed. According to state recording statutes, the
trustee's hypothetical judicial lien would be prior in time and
thereby prior in right to a judgment lien unperfected on the day of
filing.214 Having thus lost his lien and his secured status, the judg-
ment creditor becomes a general creditor of the bankrupt estate.
Section 545 permits the trustee to avoid certain statutory liens.
Although regulated by statute, a judgment lien is not a statutory
lien 21 5 and does not come within the scope of this section.1 8
Section 547 of the 1978 Code governs the trustee's ability to
avoid preferential transfers of the bankrupt's property.217 As de-
fined in the statute, a transfer is a preference and thereby voidable
by the trustee if it meets the following conjunctive criteria. Within
the ninety days immediately preceding filing of the bankruptcy pe-
211. 11 U.S.C.A. § 544(a) (West Supp. 1979). This provision is the successor of § 70c of
the 1898 Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 110c (1970) (repealed 1978).
212. 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(4) (West Supp. 1979).
213. A "judicial lien" means a lien obtained by legal or equitable process, including judg-
ment, levy, or sequestration. Id. § 101(27). Sections 544(a)(2) and 544(a)(3) grant the trustee
the powers of a hypothetical creditor with an unsatisfied execution or of a bona fide pur-
chaser, respectively. Section 544(a)(3) is of little value in states like Virginia where recorda-
tion is required to establish the validity of a transfer as against the world. The provision is
necessary, however, in states with recording statutes that require recordation of security
interests in realty to prevail against bona fide purchasers only.
214. See note 107 supra & accompanying text.
215. The 1978 Code defines a "statutory lien" to be a "lien arising solely by force of a
statute on specified circumstances or conditions, but not [a] judicial lien." 11
U.S.C.A. § 101(38) (West Supp. 1979).
216. Id. § 545.
217. Id. § 547. Section 547 succeeds § 60 of the 1898 Act. Bankruptcy Act of 1898 § 60, 11
U.S.C. § 96 (1970) (repealed in 1978).
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tition and while insolvent, the debtor must transfer property to or
for the benefit of a creditor in satisfaction of an antecedent debt,
thereby enabling the creditor to receive more than he would in a
hypothetical day of bankruptcy distribution.218
A judgment lien created within the ninety day period prior to
filing of the bankruptcy petition is a preference under the above
section 547(b) definition. As discussed earlier, a judgment lien is a
transfer. 19 It benefits the judgment creditor 220 by giving him prior-
ity over other creditors. Because it secures the debt represented by
the judgment, a judgment lien is a transfer for or on account of an
antecedent debt. The 1978 Code creates a presumption of insol-
vency during the ninety-day period. 21
To determine whether the alleged preference falls within the
ninety-day period, a transfer is made when the lien is perfected. 222
In Virginia, the date of transfer for judgment liens is the date of
docketing. Calculation of the ninety-day period requires exclusion
of the day of docketing and inclusion of the day the petition was
filed.225
The final test for a preference is whether the creditor receives
more by the transfer than he would be in a bankruptcy distribu-
tion.224 The court compares what the creditor received under the
judgment lien with what he would receive if there was no judgment
lien in a hypothetical bankruptcy distribution on the day of trans-
218. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(b) (West Supp. 1979). See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 192, at
177, 372 reprinted in AD. NEws, supra note 192, at 6137, 6328. These five requirements
change the former preference test, which required proof of insolvency at the time of the
preferential transfer and proof that the creditor had reasonable cause to believe the debtor
insolvent. Section 547 eliminates the reasonable cause requirement and reduces the former
four-month preferential period to ninety days. The ninety days is expanded to one year,
however, if the transferee is an insider or has reasonable cause to believe the debtor is insol-
vent. Therefore, the reasonable cause test is not entirely dead.
219. See note 212 supra & accompanying text.
220. A judgment creditor comes within the Code's definition of "creditor" as an entity
with a claim. 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(9) (West Supp. 1979). "Claim" is defined in id. § 101(4).
221. Id. § 547(0.
222. Id. § 547(e)(1)(A). Upon docketing by the judgment creditor, a bona fide purchaser
from the debtor loses his ability to obtain a superior interest in the debtor's real estate.
Thus docketing meets the test for perfection established by § 547(e)(1)(A).
223. FED. R. Civ. P 6(a), R. BANKR. P 906(a). Section 547(e)(2) provides a ten-day grace
period within which to perfect, but otherwise dates the transfer from docketing or, if not
perfected at filing, from the day before filing. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(e)(2) (West Supp. 1979).
224. 11 U.S.C.A. §. 547(b)(5) (West Supp. 1979).
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fer."2 ' Because the creditor would recover as a general creditor ab-
sent the lien, a judgment lien obtained within the ninety-day pe-
riod meets this final requirement for a preference and therefore
may be invalidated.
Under section 549, the trustee also has power to avoid transfers
that occur after commencement of the case.m8 A judgment lien
commencing or enforced without court permission after the bank-
ruptcy petition is filed constitutes a postbankruptcy transfer void-
able by the trustee. 227 Judgment lienors do not qualify as good
faith purchasers under section 549(c) because they do not take by
voluntary transfer.228
Section 546(a) contains a statute of limitation on the exercise of
the trustee's avoidance powers. 229 The limitation is the earlier of
two years from the trustee's appointment or from the close or dis-
missal of the case.280 Section 546(b) permits a judgment lienor in
jurisdictions that date a judgment lien by the relation back doc-
trine to perfect his lien against the trustee and avoid invalidation
even though the judgment is recovered or the lien arises after
bankruptcy.2 1 Because Virginia no longer recognizes the relation
back doctrine,3 2 section 546(b) has no application to Virginia judg-
ment liens.
Section 522, the exemption provision in the new Act, confers
limited avoidance powers on the bankrupt debtor.283 Under section
522(f), the debtor may avoid the fixing of a judicial lien on his in-
terests in property to the extent such lien impairs an exemption.
Either of two exemption schedules are available to the debtor
225. Id. Under the former preference section, whether a creditor had received a prefer-
ence was determined by the actual effect of the alleged preference when bankruptcy re-
sulted, not by the effect on a hypothetical distribution at the time of the transfer. Palmer
Clay Prod. Co. v. Brown, 297 U.S. 227, 229 (1936) (construing §§ 60(a) and 60(b) of the 1898
Act). Under the 1978 Code, the judge must consider how the estate would be distributed
among all the creditors at the date of the transfer.
226. 11 U.S.C.A. § 549 (West Supp. 1979). Under this provision, the trustee must act
within two years of the petition's filing or before the case is closed or dismissed. Id. § 549(d).
227. Id. § 549(a)(2)(B).
228. Id. § 549(c).
229. Id. § 546(a).
230. Id.
231. Id. § 546(b).
232. See note 8 supra & accompanying text.
233. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522 (West Supp. 1979).
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under the 1978 Code: (1) state exemptions plus nonbankruptcy
federal exemptions and property owned as tenancy by the entirety
or joint tenancy; or (2) the federal exemption schedule in section
522(d), which includes jointly-owned and entireties property if the
state exempts these.3 4 The 1978 Code, however, also allows states
to prohibit use of the federal exemption schedule.23 5 The 1978
Code provides each state with the option of denying its citizens the
availability of the federal exemption scheme; Virginia recently has
elected to limit the exemptions in bankruptcy to those provided
under state law.236 A Virginia debtor in bankruptcy therefore can
avoid a judgment lien only to the extent the lien encumbers prop-
erty covered under the state $5000 homestead exemption.23 7
CONCLUSION
The judgment lien is the primary means by which a money judg-
ment can be enforced against real property but it is also one of the
least used creditor's remedies. If insurance to satisfy a judgment,
does not exist garnishment or execution against the debtor's per-
sonal property generally offers the creditor a simpler and less
costly method of enforcement. Nevertheless, the judgment lien on
real property still provides an important tool to the otherwise un-
secured creditor and, concomitantly, provides some modicum of
protection to the debtor. Because the enforcement procedure is
both expensive and time consuming, the judgment lien discourages
the creditor from resorting to its use when only small amounts are
at stake, thereby ensuring the debtor that he will not lose his home
or other realty when the debt is for insignficant amounts. The
creditor, however, is protected when the debts are sizable and war-
rant a creditor's bill by allowing him to proceed against the
debtor's most valued possession, his land. Also, should the debtor
choose bankruptcy over payment, the lien gives the creditor a pri-
ority over the other general creditors. Even though the lien may be
234. Id. § 522(b).
235. Id.
236. VA. CODE § 34-3.1 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
237. Id. § 34-4. The dollar limitation in the Virginia homestead exemption statute is
$5,000, as compared with the more liberal $7,500 limit in the federal exemption schedule. 11
U.S.C.A. § 522(d)(1) (West Supp. 1979).
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enforced infrequently, the priority it offers the creditor over subse-
quent and general creditors plus the leverage it provides the credi-
tor in his dealings with the debtor ensures its continued inpor-
tance in the future.
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